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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the trade, fiscal and development effects of the Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) between the EU and the member states of the SADC EPA group. The agreement is 
set to advance the trade relationship between the parties as well as create and facilitate trade in-
between the SADC member states. The conclusions of this study  are that the trade patterns between 
the negotiating parties will be affected, as well as trade between the SADC EPA group and trade 
patterns with the rest of the world (ROW). Positive effects of the agreement are those indicating less 
expensive imports in the SADC area, but we have also found evidence of trade diversion where exports 
from the EU increases on the expense of exporters from ROW. Also, the SADC  EPA countries will 
experience losses in tariff revenues due to the 80-85 percent tariff liberalization on imports from the EU. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) open up a new chapter in the history  of preferential 
trade agreements between the European countries and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states. 
These agreements are the successors of the one-way preferences and trade relationship between the 
European Union (EU) and the ACP countries. Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) no longer 
accept non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements, an alteration of the regimes governing the trade 
preferences was necessary. Therefore, in order to secure the preferential treatment on the EU market 
previously granted the ACP countries, the parties initiated the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) that were to be compatible with the rules of the WTO. 
1.2. Objective
In this paper, we aim to analyze the design, structure and the likely outcome of an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and the six  member states of the Southern African 
Development Community  (SADC), Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland, 
who collectively negotiate on an interim EPA with the EU. In our analysis we have chosen to foremost 
focus on the trade and fiscal effects of the agreement, complemented by discussions on impacts on 
development. We intend to analyze the effects and impacts on SADC EPA economies of the agreement 
given the theory of economics following the introduction of an FTA. 
1.3. Method and Material
In our analysis of the Interim EPA we use theory on static (trade and fiscal) and development effects of 
FTA. We further analyze the Interim EPA from this theoretical setting and investigate what possible 
effects it could have on the SADC region and its member states. We also include a discussion on the 
effects on the rest of the world. To accomplish this we use statistical data from databases and sources 
we consider trustworthy  and commonly  used in economic analysis such as this one. We have used data 
from the WTO and the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the WTO and the United Nations. 
The complexity  of the choice and interpretation of the data lies in the agreement’s constantly  changing 
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conditions as well as in the different configurations of member states within the EPA groups. In order to 
overcome those obstacles we have chosen to make a selection of data that is compatible with the later 
form of the EU-SADC Interim EPA. 
1.4. Delimitation  
The concept of the EPAs is very  wide, and many  different aspects can be analyzed while referring to the 
design of the different agreements. The ACP group of states negotiates in different sub-regions and we 
have chosen to focus on the Southern African Development Community  (SADC). In our analysis of the 
Interim EPA between the EU and the SADC EPA region we limit our discussion to possible trade and 
fiscal effects with the addition of development effects we have found suitable for the situation. We have 
chosen not to incorporate the SADC EPA countries’ trade agreements with ROW which possibly  play an 
important role in the present and future trade patterns. Furthermore, feasible multilateral trade 
liberalization in the world, due to trade negotiations within the WTO, will not be discussed further, even 
though this is an important topic when it comes to effects of economic regional integration.  
1.5. Disposition
The thesis opens with an introduction and background to the EU-SADC Economic Partnership 
Agreement. In this section we explain the conditions leading to the introduction of the EPAs in the 
Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries. Furthermore there is a presentation of the 
setting in which the Interim EPA of the SADC region is introduced. In Chapter 3, the economic theory of 
PTAs, foremost FTAs, applicable on the EPAs regarding design and plausible effects, is presented. 
Moreover, Chapter 4 introduces the Interim EPA between the EU and the SADC EPA group and here we 
present the parts of the agreement where the parties have come to agreements and which are 
important for the economic effects following the Interim EPA. Finally, in Chapter 5 we put emphasis on 
the effects of the Interim EPA followed by an analysis of the trade flows between the SADC EPA group 
and countries outside the agreement process. In addition, in Chapter 5 we also bring up the possible 
effects of development we find reasonable regarding the design of the Interim EPA as well as the 
plausible alternatives to the agreement. Finally, in Chapter 6, we address the conclusions of our 
analysis and present a section on policy implications. 
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2. The EU-SADC Economic Pa r tne rsh ip 
Agreements - background
The European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have a traditionally 
long relationship of trade and development policies. Different trade and economic development 
agreements covering trade and economic development has governed this relationship. In 1975, the first 
Lomé Convention was signed between EU and the ACP States. This Convention was later followed by 
three succeeding Conventions; the last one expired in 2000. The precursors to the first Lomé 
Convention were the Yaoundé Conventions between six  European countries and eighteen African 
countries; the first one signed in 1963.  
2.1. The WTO and the Cotonou Agreement
The non-reciprocal trade preferences between the EU and the ACP countries have previously  been 
granted waivers from the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1995, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the GATT. Thereafter, the pressure on the aforementioned 
partied increased to develop a WTO-compatible trade regime that would not contradict the rules of the 
Organization governing preferential trade agreements among member states. The previous EU-ACP 
trade regime did not comply  with either Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO that governs the reciprocal trade 
agreements among members of the Organization, nor the Enabling clause. The Enabling clause 
governs the different alternatives for developing countries when creating trade preference schemes. 
Thus, the last waiver from the rules of the WTO was signed in Doha in 2001, under the condition that 
the concerned parties agreed to work out a new preference scheme compatible with the GATT/WTO. 
Following the pressure from the WTO, the EU and the ACP countries signed the Cotonou Agreement 
(also known as the “Partnership Agreement”) in Cotonou, Benin in 2000. In order to move towards a 
WTO-compatible trade agreement, the parties committed to further extend and develop the economic 
relationship. It was concluded that the trade preferences of the Cotonou Agreement were to be followed 
by Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which were to be in line with the development of the 
world trading system and the rules of the WTO. The Cotonou Agreement also presented the 
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fundamental objectives of the EPAs and founded the deeper integration process needed to proceed with 
the trade preferences granted, ACP exports on the EU market (Cotonou Agreement, 2000). 
In order to proceed with making the EU-ACP trade preference scheme WTO-compatible, the ACP 
countries were divided into seven sub-regional groups. The preference schemes negotiated on among 
the sub-regional groups and the EU are to be compatible with Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO. This 
requires a large adjustment of the economic relationship seeing that Article XXIV only enables countries 
to form preferential trade agreements (PTAs) formed on a reciprocal basis. Moreover, the article allows 
negotiations of PTAs only  under the condition that tariffs on trade and regulations of commerce are to be 
eliminated on ‘substantially all trade’ (SAT) (GATT Article XXIV, Paragraph 8b). In addition, any interim 
agreement that aim to result in a fully  established FTA has to include a plan for the liberalization of SAT 
‘within a reasonable period of time’ (GATT Article XXIV, Paragraph 5c).    
 
2.2. The EPAs and SADC
The Cotonou Agreement states that the EPAs were to enter into force by  1 January 2008. This deadline 
has already passed, and at the time being, has been set at further notice. In Article XXVII of the 
Agreement it is established that the parties should be as flexible as possible when it comes to deciding 
the duration of the transition period, designated to remove trade barriers and adjust the markets 
between the EU and the regional groupings of the ACP States (The Cotonou Agreement, 2000). The 
EPAs are being negotiated on at the time of writing and interim EPAs are the first stage for future full 
agreements on reciprocal trade preferences between the EU and the ACP countries. Undoubtedly, the 
negotiation processes among the ACP regional groupings are very  different and the number of signatory 
countries in every  region varies. Originally, the ACP States were divided into six  sub-regions, West 
Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, Southern African Development Community, 
Caribbean and Pacific (http://ec.europa.eu/trade). 
The Southern African Development Community  (SADC) consists of Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (http://www.sadc.int/). However, the EU-SADC 
negotiations on an interim and future full EPA do not involve all the members of the Community. The 
SADC members included in the SADC EPA group were originally  set out to be only  seven countries, 
namely  Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania (European 
Commission, 2005:7). Tanzania is involved in negotiations within the East and Southern African group 
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and East African Community, thus, they  are no longer included in the SADC EPA group (http://
ec.europa.eu/trade). Furthermore, South Africa joined the EU-SADC negotiations on an EPA in 2007, 
although the country already has a signed trade agreement with the EU, referred to as the Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). Currently three countries, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Mozambique, have signed the interim EU-SADC EPA (European Commission, EPA Update, 2009). 
Angola, as a Least Developed Country  (LDC) enjoy free access to the EU  market though the Everything 
But Arms (EBA) preference scheme whilst South Africa benefits from the TDCA. Namibia is still deciding 
on whether or not they  are going to sign the interim agreement (European Commission, EPA Update, 
2009). All SADC EPA States continue to negotiate on a full economic partnership agreement with the 
EU, which is why we have decided to include all SADC EPA States in our analysis of the EU-SADC 
EPA. 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa together constitute the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) (http://www.sacu.int/). Thus, SACU plays an important role in the EU-SADC 
EPA negotiations. South Africa (SA) is the greatest trade power within the CU, and the SACU countries 
excluding SA is often referred to as BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland). Below, figure 
2.1. illustrates the different regional trade agreement constellations of the Eastern and Southern African 
ACP countries.
The regional arrangements among Eastern and Southern African ACP countries. Tanzania 
is a part of the SADC but negotiate on an EPA with the EAC. Five out of seven SADC EPA 
countries are members of the SACU. Source: http://www.comesa.int, http://ec.europa.eu/
trade[a]
Figure 2.1. Regional agreements in Eastern and Southern Africa
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3. The Economics of Integration and the EPAs
The economic theory of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) explores the effects that occur when 
countries are integrated through trade agreements. As introduced by  Balassa in the 1960s, the process 
of integration is often described in different stages. The initial step of integration is a free trade area 
(FTA). The FTA is followed by a customs union (CU). After the CU, common markets are introduced, 
which is followed by  an economic and monetary union. The final step of integration is the 
implementation of a political union. Instead of regarding these stages as steps in an ascending order, 
they  are useful and can be referred to when analyzing different forms of integration (Senior Nello 
2005:3f). In this paper, we will focus our analysis on FTAs.  
PTAs such as free trade areas and customs unions are in many aspects similar and aim to remove all 
barriers on trade between the member countries. However, an FTA differs from a CU seeing that it does 
not call for the member countries to enforce a common external tariff (CET) policy. All members of an 
FTA are free to set their own external tariff rates towards the rest of the world (ROW). Furthermore, an 
FTA includes rules of origin (ROO) which are in place to prevent trade deflection where imports from 
ROW are being transshipped through the member country  with the lowest external tariff to benefit from 
the differences in tariff rates (Robson, 1998:28). Along with the plausible changes in trade patterns 
following the formation of the FTA, ROO can affect trade among the signatory  member countries and 
ROW.
3.1. Theoretical framework of an FTA
As initiated by Viner in 1950, the static effects of a PTA concerns trade flows and changes in trade 
patterns and therefore effect welfare of the countries involved and ROW. Viner used the example of a 
CU when he described the effects of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation is caused by 
less efficient production in the home country that is being replaced by  more efficient production in the 
partner country, whereas the effect of trade diversion takes place when more efficient and cheaper 
production, previously imported from a third country/ROW, is replaced by imports from the new partner 
country (Viner, 1950:43). These theoretical aspects on trade effects are commonly  applied on different 
kinds of trade liberalizing agreements, not solely CUs.
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The model is based on a partial equilibrium framework where only one market is illustrated at a time to 
clarify  the potential results of certain economic measures. Furthermore, the FTA does not effect the 
member countries’ terms of trade with the ROW (Robson, 1998). The home country  is denoted H and 
the partner country  denoted P. For simplification, we assume that the import tariff in country  H before 
integration was so protective that it prevented all imports. 
Figure 3.1. illustrates the effects from a two-country  standpoint. The demand of country H is DH and its 
supply  is SH. The world supply price is assumed to be perfectly elastic and the curve, denoted PW, is 
therefore horizontal. Country H will supply  0N and country  P NN’. Country P will supply country  H at any 
price above TP and this may  cause indirect trade deflection as it may result in a shortage of supply for 
the domestic market of country  P, which will be compensated for by imports from ROW irrespective of 
the price on the product produced by country  H. It can be seen that the countries have similar demand 
curves but their efficiency  in production gives us different supply  curves. Country  P has a much more 
elastic and competitive supply curve, denoted SP, than country H. 
The figure is interpreted as follows; in home country  H area a represents trade creation, caused by 
more efficient resource allocation taking place and area c the consumer effect expressing larger 
consumption possibilities. In this case the latter is positive as the formation of the FTA enables reduction 
in price. Together those effects will outweigh trade diversion, area b. The difference between area c and 
the previous custom revenues (LN x  PWTH) that is lost when the FTA is established is a transfer of 
wealth to consumers and does not necessarily  stand for a loss in income. In country P the same amount 
will be consumed and produced at the same price. Government revenue will increase with area (PWTP x 
L’’M), since their production supplied denoted L’’M will be exported to H and their domestic demand 
satisfied by imports from ROW.
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Figure 3.1. Effects of an FTA in the home and partner country
Effects of an FTA in both member countries, H and P. Source: Robson (1998) figure 2.3. 
3.2. Static Effects of an EPA  
The Vinerian analysis on statics effects of RIAs can be applied directly  on the case of an EPA between 
the EU and a regional ACP group such as the SADC. Figure 3.2. illustrates the effects of an EPA in a 
small ACP country with regards to price and import volumes. The small ACP country  is part of a regional 
FTA with other ACP countries who forms an EPA with the EU causing tariff liberalization on all EU 
products imported by the regional ACP-FTA. Thus PEU < PW when following the EPA tariff liberalization. 
More efficient imports from the EU replace less efficient production that was previously  imported from 
the partner country  causing trade creation, 0M1. Less efficient EU imports replacing imports from ROW 
leads to trade diversion, M1M2. M2M3 illustrates the consumption expansion effect in the small ACP 
country seeing that there are now more goods to consume. In addition, the tariff liberalization causes a 
decline in government income due to less tariff revenues. This loss is described by  areas a+b. 
Furthermore, the global welfare loss that occurs referring to the trade diversion effects will depend on 
the efficiency of the producers in the EU. With more efficient EU production, losses of trade diversion 
will be relatively smaller (Milner et al., 2005:333). 
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Figure 3.2. Effects of an EPA in a small ACP country
Effects of an EU-ACP regional EPA in a small ACP country illustrating changes in 
import volumes. Source: Milner et al. (2005) figure 1.
3.2.1 Analysis of Outcome
The overall outcome on welfare, positive, negative or non-existing, caused by the static effects following 
an introduction of an FTA will further depend on the setting in which the FTA is introduced. A general 
analysis of the outcome might be misleading but the principles of an FTA can be simplified. The positive 
effects from introducing an FTA are likely  to be increased if the previous tariffs are higher. In addition the 
FTA will gain from high number of countries joining the agreement as well as the economic size of those 
countries. Finally, the geographical distance between the member states affects the transport costs and 
thus the total effects of the FTA. Furthermore, the shape of the economies and their preceding relations 
affect the outcome. Competitive economies among the member states are preferable as it may 
advocate specialization and great trade flows as well as established economic relations that are likely to 
have positive effect on the welfare (Senior Nello, 2005:99).
3.3. Development effects of an FTA
The forming of an FTA introduces new dimensions to integration among the member countries. Those 
can be referred to as development- or dynamic effects. We expect those effects to comprise 
specialization, larger market that opens for better exploitation of economies of scale and technological 
progress (Senior Nello, 2005:103). Specialization, meaning improved location of industry, and 
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economies of scale defined as the lower production costs per unit resulting from of larger scale of 
production. The effects on production flows and efficiency is further predicted to be triggered by 
increased competition, since competition is considered a vital factor for the promotion of restructuring of 
industry  leading to reduced production costs and consumer prices. These effects influence the static 
effects of an FTA in the long run and are therefore important to acknowledge. The overall welfare effects 
of a trade liberalizing agreement such as the regional EU-ACP EPAs will cause static as well as 
development effects and large changes in trade patterns can have positive effects on the dynamics of 
an PTA.   
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4. Interim EPA between the EU and SADC
‘The Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between the SADC EPA states, on the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, on the other part, also referred to as the Interim EPA. The 
Interim EPA was signed on September the 19th in 2008, and introduces six  objectives which function as 
fundaments of the commitment made by the concerned parties (Interim EPA, 2008). 
The objectives of the Interim EPA are:
• Contribute to the reduction and ultimate eradication of poverty,
• Promote regional integration, economic cooperation and good governance,
• Support the gradual integration of the SADC EPA States into the world economy,
• Progress the SADC EPA States’ capacity in trade policy and trade related issues,
• Promote conditions for increased investment and private sector initiatives as well as improve 
supply capacity, competitiveness and economic growth in the SADC EPA States,
• Support new trade dynamics and strengthen relations between the EU  and SADC EPA States on 
the basis of solidarity and mutual interest (Interim EPA, 2008:Article 1).
The objectives of the Interim EPA are to be achieved by  approaching different areas of cooperation. One 
of those that are closely  related to the effects in trade and fiscal policies is the cooperation that is to 
encompass commodity trade. By  the realization of the agreement’s intents a new prerequisite for trade 
between the SADC EPA countries and the EU are set. Trade is to be liberalized between the negotiating 
parties as well as among the SADC EPA countries. Trade in goods covers the liberalization of tariffs and 
customs duties, which is aimed at creating a free trade area. In addition, it includes rules of origin and 
other non-tariff barriers such as quantitative restrictions. 
In Article 19 of the Interim EPA the FTA is established. The paragraph expresses the need to liberalize in 
conformity with the Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO. The Interim EPA does not pronounce the 
interpretation of the stipulations of the WTO. However, the EU interprets the conditions for liberalization 
in trade of the Article XXIV of the WTO/GATT to include 90 percent of the total bilateral trade among the 
members of the FTA (www.acp-eu-trade.org). Furthermore, EU will liberalize nearly 100 percent of their 
imports from the SADC EPA region (with transition periods for special goods) (Interim EPA, 2008: Article 
16
25), which will enable the SADC EPA group to liberalize only  80-85 percent of their imports from the EU 
over a 15-year period. 15-20 percent of the goods imported from the EU will not be liberalized under the 
Interim EPA. The groups of goods excluded from the duty- and quota-free treatments for products 
originating from the SADC EPA region imported by the EU are usually  described as sensitive goods. 
They include some agricultural products as well as the group defined as “Arms and ammunition, parts 
and accessories”, found in Chapter 93 of the Harmonized System Code (HS Code)1 (Interim EPA, 2008: 
Annex II). 
In Article 21, the concept of the EU-SADC FTA is deepened and further defined with the addition of 
ROO. In the agreement it is stated that the ROO are to be reviewed within a time period of three years 
from the time the Interim EPA is enforced. This Article outlines a simplification and liberalization of ROO 
that according to theoretical aspects of ROO can have positive impacts on trade flows within the region 
and relative to ROW. 
The liberalization process is also aimed in the intra-SADC EPA region where the FTA is to enable free 
circulation of goods among the SADC EPA member states. This duty-and tariff-free area is recognized 
in Article 27 of the Interim EPA, which is in accordance with the SADC Protocol on Trade. The SADC 
Protocol on Trade was agreed upon in 1996 and establishes a free trade area among all 14 SADC 
member countries by 2008. The agreement came into effect in 2000 (SADC Protocol on Trade, 1996). 
Among these countries, the SADC EPA States, as well as South Africa, are included, which is important 
for the outcome of the Interim EPA between the EU and SADC. The Interim EPA thus affects the trade 
development among all SADC member states and not solely  the SADC countries participating in the 
EU-SADC EPA negotiations. 
The Interim EPA is set out to support the regional integration process within the SADC EPA group. 
Although, the pace and level of integration is decided on a country basis by  the states themselves. The 
integration process is also to be invoked in conformity  with the policies of the SACU agreement on 
development2  as well as other preexisting treaties in the region (Interim EPA, 2008: Article 4). The 
SACU agreement signed in 2002 concludes that SACU members can negotiate and form FTAs with 
third parties as a bloc (The SACU Agreement, 2002). Therefore, the SACU, with all five member states, 
play a significant role in the negotiations of the EU-SADC EPA. Moreover, Article 31 of the Interim EPA 
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1 The entire HS Code can be found at http://www.foreign-trade.com/reference/hscode.htm
2 The SACU Agreement was signed on 21 October 2002 (Interim EPA, 2008: Article 4) 
states that the agreement may not prevent the establishment of other agreements that promote 
integration as long as they do not interfere with the trade conditions of the Interim EPA. Considering the 
nature of the CU, this can be critical to the SACU Agreement. South Africa is the greatest trade power in 
the region and has, as previously  mentioned, its own trade agreement with the EU, TDCA, with a 
different trade protocol than the previous Lomé/Cotonou preferences granted the ACP countries. With 
the Interim EPA the relationship between the regions will be further deepened, i.e. the different parties 
within the SADC EPA group will be closer linked to the same trade protocol with the EU than ever 
previously observed (Walker, 2009:3). 
The Interim EPA issues facilitation of the technical barriers to trade as a concern for regional integration 
(Interim EPA, 2008: Article 51). Facilitation of trade in goods, by integrating and harmonizing the 
processes and standards, are objectives that are issued in Chapter 8 of the Interim EPA. The 
agreement further assesses the value of developing a common approach on the regulatory 
performance, dealing for example with issues on transparency, common standards and market 
surveillance.
The elimination of import tariffs on products from the EU, as well as from intra-SADC trade are assumed 
to have an affect on the SADC EPA States and is therefore dealt with as a delicate matter in the Interim 
EPA. In Article 17, cooperation in fiscal adjustment, subjects the possible losses in fiscal revenues as a 
result of the trade reforms. The parties have agreed on that a certain level of support for fiscal reforms 
are to be included by  the cooperation which will assist the SADC  EPA countries in dealing with fiscal 
difficulties.  
The Interim EPA between the EU and SADC is an important step towards a full EPA between the 
regions. Considering it is an interim agreement (i.e. working as a full agreement until future agreements 
are met) there are certain areas of cooperation which are still to be covered by  the negotiations. 
Therefore, the total outcome and plausible economic effects are difficult to predict. So far, the parties 
have agreed to postpone specific areas of the future full EPA due to the complexity of the cooperation. 
The main topics of the full EPA are the development and cooperation in the service sector and the 
provisions on finance and investment. Furthermore, there are negotiations on cooperation in the areas 
of competition and public procurement (Interim EPA, 2008:Article 11). During the negotiation process, 
issues of concern have been raised by  the different parties and functioning internal relationships within 
the SADC region and SACU are essential for a future full EPA. 
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5. Effects of an EU-SADC EPA
The Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and SADC will have economic effects on all the 
parties involved. These changes are often described with changes in trade between the EU and SADC 
alone but nevertheless, it is important to also acknowledge the effects on the intra-SADC development 
and the plausible effects on the rest of the world. In this section we put emphasis the effects of the EU-
SADC Interim EPA analyzing trade flows and tariff data among the parties involved in the negotiations, 
as well as trade flows between the SADC EPA countries and countries outside the agreement process. 
Furthermore, we acknowledge the fiscal and development effects of the trade liberalization. 
5.1. Trade Patterns of the SADC EPA States
The import and export patterns of the SADC EPA countries are diverse and this fact is important to 
acknowledge when analyzing the effects of an EU-SADC EPA. Although there are similarities such as 
low levels of export diversification, we can also observe several differences regarding export and import 
patterns of the SADC EPA States. Angola’s exports and imports are described in figure 5.1. Figures 5.2. 
and 5.3. show the exports and imports by main destinations and origins for all SADC EPA States except 
Angola. 
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5.1.1. Angola
As we can see in figure 5.1. (a), Angola exports a large share of their commodities to the United States, 
38 percent, which indicate that Angola’s export sector is rather dependent on the US. Furthermore, 34.1 
percent are destined for the Chinese market whilst Chinese Taipei receives 5.8 percent. The forth 
largest export destination is France with 4.8 percent of the total share. It is difficult to estimate the total 
share for the EU, but the US and China together represent a large majority  of the exports of Angola, 
whereas the EU plays a minor role. None of their partners in the SADC region are among their most 
important export partners. As illustrated by table 5.1. the country has a very  low level of diversification in 
their export sector. Nearly  98 percent of Angola’s total exports belong to the Mineral fuels, oils, 
distillation products etc. where petroleum is the single most important export product (WTO, 2006: Part 
2) Moreover, the second largest export industry  is Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins etc., which 
represents 1.7 percent. These numbers show that country’s export sector is highly dependent on natural 
resources. This is also illustrated by Figure 1 in Appendix I. 
Table 5.1. Angola Top 5 export industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Exports value (USD 
thousands)
Exports as a share of total 
exports (%)
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. (27) 31,370,117 97.8727
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. (71) 555,395 1.7328
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates nes. (03) 28,088 0.0876
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement (25) 20,306 0.0634
Commodities not elsewhere specified (99) 18,977 0.0592
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
Similar to the country’s export patterns, the biggest share of imports originates from the United States. 
However, the total share of imports sources from the US is smaller compared to exports measuring only 
14.9 percent. Portugal, with 14.6 percent, is the second single most important import partner and nearly 
equals the share sourced from the US. 9.9 percent origins from the Republic of Korea, 8.6 percent from 
China and the fifth largest import partner is Brazil who accounts for 8.1 percent of total imports.  These 
figures are more diverse compared with the exports, but the US and China play  big parts when if comes 
to foreign trade in Angola. Yet, we have reason to believe that the total share of imports from the EU is 
larger than the Portuguese share. In similarity  with the export sector, the country does not import any 
essential parts of their commodities from their SADC partners, a fact that is in accordance with the 
conclusions made on the export sector. Compared with the export sector, Angola’s imports are more 
diverse. This is presented in table 5.2. where we can see that nearly  16 percent of the country’s imports 
are from the Boilers, machinery: nuclear reactors etc. industry. The four remaining import industries 
represent from approximately 8.5 to 9.6 percent as seen in table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2. Angola Top 5 import industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Imports value (USD thousands) Imports as a share of total imports 
(%)
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84) 1,745,705 16.8694
Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) 995,441 9.6193
Ships, boats and other floating structures (89) 950,056 9.1808
Electrical, electronic equipment (85) 889,249 8.5932
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof (88) 873,498 8.4409
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
5.1.2. Botswana
Figure 5.2. (a) illustrates the large share of Botswana’s export commodities destined for the EU, 67.6 
percent. Aside from the EU as the country’s main export destination, South Africa as well as Norway 
and Zimbabwe are important importers of goods from Botswana. A small share of Botswana’s exports is 
destined for the Chinese market, 1.8 percent and Zimbabwe receives 1.3 percent. This gives us an idea 
of the importance of the SADC partners referring to the export sector since South Africa is a very 
important trade partner. Although, SA and Zimbabwe are the only partner countries mentioned among 
the top 5 export partners and Zimbabwe is far from the level of SA. Furthermore, as can be seen in 
table 5.3. a large share of the exports sourced from Botswana are centralized around one industry 
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins etc. stands for nearly 75 percent of the country’s total exports. 
The second largest export industry  is Copper and articles thereof which represents almost 14 percent of 
the total exports of Botswana. Industries such as Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet, Meat 
and edible meat offal and Ores, slag and ash are all important exports of Botswana, but they  only 
represent one to two per cent of the country’s total exports. As seen in figure 1 (Appendix I) the country 
exports mainly manufactures. However, the country’s dependence on its natural resources is very high.
Table 5.3. Botswana Top 5 export industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Exports value (USD thousands) Exports as a share of total 
exports (%)
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. (71) 3,350,899 74.3623
Copper and articles thereof (74) 619,782 13.7540
Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet (61) 93,557 2.0762
Meat and edible meat offal (02) 81,365 1.8056
Ores, slag and ash (26) 57,776 1.2822
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
Figure 5.3. (a) illustrates the SADC EPA countries’ import patterns, which shows that Botswana imports 
a great majority of their commodities from South Africa, 83.5 percent to be precise. The dependence on 
South Africa when it comes to imports, illustrates a strong relationship between the neighboring 
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countries. In addition, the EU is an important import origin for the Botswana market and stands for 6 
percent of the country’s total imports. Other essential trade partners are China, Zimbabwe and the 
United States, though their share of the total imports only measure between one and two percent. As 
described in the last section, the only  two SADC partners positioned among the top 5 import partners 
are SA and Zimbabwe, where SA is the dominant of the two. There is no evidence of intensive trade 
with the other SADC countries. Table 5.4. shows that Botswana imports goods in the Mineral fuel, oils, 
distillation products HS group measuring roughly  17 percent of the total imports. The second most 
important import industry is Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. that stands for about 10.2 percent 
of all goods imported in the country.
Table 5.4. Botswana Top 5 import industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Imports value (USD 
thousands)
Imports as a share of total 
imports (%)
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. (27) 525,882 17.2234
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84) 312,145 10.2232
Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) 275,375 9.0189
Electrical, electronic equipment (85) 198,870 6.5133
Articles of iron or steel (73) 148,877 4.8759
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
5.1.3. Lesotho
Illustrated by Figure 5.2. (b) Lesotho exports a large share of their total exports to the United States. 
Almost 69 percent of the country’s total exports are destined for the US market. Their second largest 
export destination is South Africa since approximately  18 percent of Lesotho’s total exports are destined 
there. Other important export destinations are the EU, Switzerland and Canada who stand for 9.9, 2.8 
and 0.6 percent respectively. This shows us that the SADC countries, exception SA, do not have large 
parts in the export trade of Lesotho. Table 5.5. shows that the country first and foremost exports Articles 
of apparel, accessories, knit crochet, and the industry  stands for almost 50 percent of all of the country’s 
total exports. However, the second largest export industry is Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
crochet, which is rather similar to the most important industry. The second group (62) represents 29.4 
percent of the total exports of Lesotho, which shows that the country’s export industry is highly 
dependent on textiles and articles thereof. This is further strengthened by the forth largest export 
industry, Cotton (52). The third most essential export commodity  group is Pearls, precious stones, 
metals, coins, etc, which almost 19 percent of the total exports. 
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Table 5.5. Lesotho Top 5 export industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Exports value (USD thousands) Exports as a share of total 
exports (%)
Articles of apparel, accessories, knit crochet (61) 262,723 49.6880
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet (62) 155,659 29.4393
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. (71) 97,770 18.4910
Cotton (52) 6,050 1.1442
Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica etc articles (68) 1,538 0.2909
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
The country’s import sector is highly  dependent on South Africa and as Figure 5.3. (b) shows, about 78 
percent of Lesotho’s total imports source from their neighbor. Furthermore, Lesotho imports a large 
share of goods from Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong, China as well as mainland China. They  represent 
6.3, 5.7 and 4 percent of Lesotho’s total imports, whereas the EU only measures 2.3 percent. SA plays 
a dominant role in Lesotho’s imports, but with this exception, the rest of the SADC  partners are not 
mentioned among the top 5 import sources. Table 5.6. illustrates the import patterns of Lesotho by main 
industries. Here, we can see that the country imports mainly Knitted or crocheted fabric. This industry 
group is the single largest when the import sector is analyzed with approximately  41 percent of all goods 
imported in the country. Moreover, Electrical, electronic equipment and Cotton also represent an 
essential share of the imports with about 14 and 11.5 percent of the total imports, respectively. Here, we 
can see the significance of the textile sector in Lesotho since Knits and Cotton are among the top three 
import industries. Also, Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. and Commodities not elsewhere 
specified stands for about 6 and 3 percent, respectively.    
Table 5.6. Lesotho Top 5 import industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Imports value (USD thousands) Imports as a share of total 
imports (%)
Knitted or crocheted fabric (60) 108,353 41.3931
Electrical, electronic equipment (85) 36,708 14.0232
Cotton (52) 30,177 11.5282
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84) 15,458 5.9053
Commodities not elsewhere specified (99) 7,294 2.7865
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
5.1.4. Mozambique
When it comes to Mozambique, Figure 5.2. (c) illustrates that South Africa is an important export 
destination since the country exports about 18 percent of their total exports to their neighbor country. 
However, the largest share of exports is specified as Unspecified destinations whereas none of these 
destinations solely are larger than the other five in the figure. The second single most important export 
destination is the EU, which receives for 6.1 percent of Mozambique’s total exported commodities. 
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Aside from South Africa and the EU, Mozambique exports 3 per cent of total exports to Zimbabwe, 1.8 
percent to China and approximately  1 percent to Kenya. Except for SA and Zimbabwe the country  does 
not export significant shares to the rest of the SADC. As table 5.7. illustrates, goods in the Aluminum 
and articles thereof sector is the single most important export products for Mozambique. The country 
relays a majority  of their exports on this sector seeing that approximately 60 percent of all exported 
commodities origins from this natural resource. Moreover the second most essential export sector in 
Mozambique is Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. whereas this further emphasized the 
country’s dependence on natural resources when it comes to exports. Mineral fuels, oils, distillation 
products etc. represents almost 15 percent of the country’s total exports. 
Table 5.7. Mozambique Top 5 export industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Exports value (USD 
thousands)
Exports as a share of total 
exports (%)
Aluminum and articles thereof (27) 1,403,704 58.9511
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. (27) 349,131 14.6624
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes (24) 110,369 4.6352
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates nes. (03) 96,627 4.0580
Sugars and sugar confectionary (17) 84,710 3.5576
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
Figure 5.3. (c) illustrates Mozambique’s main import partners. The first and foremost important import 
partner is South Africa, which is the source of 31.8 percent of Mozambique’s import. Secondly, the EU 
represents a 23.5 percent share of total import. Furthermore, Mozambique imports approximately  4.3 
percent from India, 3.4 percent from China and 3.3 percent from the United Arab Emirates. Similar to 
the other SADC EPA States, Mozambique does not have significant shares of imports from the SADC 
partners. The only  one listed on the top 5 list is SA. In Table 5.8. we can see that the import sector is 
dominated by Commodities not elsewhere specified, representing about 19.7 percent of imports as a 
share of total imports. The second single most important imported group of goods is Mineral fuels, oils, 
distillation products etc., accounting for approximately  17.0 percent. Other essential import industries 
are Vehicles other than railway, tramway, Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. and Cereals with 
about 9.7, 9.0 and 6.3 percent respectively.
5.8. Mozambique Top 5 import industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Imports value (USD 
thousands)
Imports as a share of total 
imports (%)
Commodities not elsewhere specified (99) 564,192 19.6632
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. (27) 487,341 16.9848
Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) 277,922 9.6861
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84) 258,296 9.0021
Cereals (10) 179,540 6.2573
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
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5.1.5. Namibia
A large share, 44.7 percent, of Namibia’s export is destined to the EU as can be seen in Figure 5.2. (d). 
The second largest export partner is SA and they  receive 29.0 percent of Namibia’s export commodities. 
6.5 percent of Namibia’s export is destined for Angola. Other major export destinations are Canada and 
China, accounting for 4.9 and 3.0 percent respectively. For Namibia, the exports to other SADC 
countries are limited, even though SA and Angola are among the top 5 export destinations. SA 
dominates the exports towards the rest of SADC since Angola only  receives 6.5 percent. The 
dominating export commodity of Namibia is from the HS group (71) Pearls, precious stones, metal, 
coins etc. that accounts for 30.4 percent of total export, illustrated by Table 5.9. The second largest 
share of total export is Fish, crustaceans, mollusks and aquatic invertebrates nes. which represents 
12.7 percent followed by Zinc and articles there of counting for 12.0 percent of total exports. This 
illustrates that the country’s export sector is dependent on primary  and intermediate goods (ITC, 2008). 
Moreover, Printed books, newspapers, pictures, etc. and Ores, slag and ash represent 8.7 and 5.4 
percent share of Namibia’s total exports.
Table 5.9. Namibia Top 5 export industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Exports value (USD 
thousands)
Exports as a share of total 
exports (%)
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. (71) 1,026,866 30.4290
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates nes. (03) 429,144 12.7168
Zinc and articles thereof (79) 404,220 11.9782
Printed books, newspapers, pictures, etc. (49) 292,597 8.6705
Ores, slag and ash (26) 182,064 5.3951
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
In a breakdown of Namibia’s import sources in Figure 5.3. (d) it can be seen that SA is Namibia’s 
foremost important source of imports. 78.1 percent origins from the neighbor country. On second place, 
with a share of 10.4 percent, is the EU, followed by China, 2.5, United States, 1.4 and Switzerland, 1.2 
percent. We conclude that imports from the rest of SADC are less important for Namibia and only  SA 
are large enough to make the top 5 list of import origins. Table 5.10. shows that it is manufactured 
goods that dominate Namibia’s import sector. Vehicles other than railway, tramway is the most important 
import commodity for Namibia, accounting for 15.1 percent share of total import followed by Boilers, 
machinery; nuclear reactors etc., 12.1 percent and Electrical, electronic equipment, 8.4 percent. 
Moreover, Articles of iron or steel and Pharmaceutical products, 4.5 and 3.3 percent respectively, qualify 
in top five import products.
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Table 5.10. Namibia Top 5 import industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Imports value (USD 
thousands)
Imports as a share of total imports 
(%)
Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) 420,996 15.0516
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84) 337,670 12.0725
Electrical, electronic equipment (85) 235,057 8.4038
Articles of iron or steel (73) 126,153 4.5103
Pharmaceutical products (30) 92,494 3.3069
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
5.1.6. South Africa
Figure 5.2. (e) illustrating a breakdown of South Africa’s main export destinations shows that the EU 
receives a third of South Africa’s exports, 33.0 percent to be exact. This is a feasible effect of the TDCA 
between South Africa and the EU. Other major export destinations are the United States, Japan, China 
and Zambia accounting for 11.8, 11.0, 6.5 and 2.2 percent respectively. Zambia is a member of SADC 
which indicates that some intra-SADC trade is important for SA. Main groups of commodities exported 
are, as illustrated in Table 5.11. products from a mix  of different process stages. However, the export 
sector is dominated by natural resources such as Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc., Iron and 
steel and Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. which represent approximately 40 percent of South 
Africa’s export and stand for a 20.7, 10.5 and 9.6 percent share if presented separately. Other important 
export commodities are Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors, etc. and Vehicles other than railway, 
tramway account for 8.9 and 8.8 percent respectively. In Appendix I, Figure 1, we conclude that the 
country’s exports are mainly manufactures and fuels and mining products. 
Table 5.11. South Africa Top 5 export industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Exports value (USD thousands) Exports as a share of total exports (%)
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. (71) 11,002,231 20.6926
Iron and steel (72) 5,599,595 10.5315
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. (27) 5,093,343 9.5794
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors, etc. (84) 4,668,559 8.7805
Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) 4,665,092 8.7739
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
South Africa’s main sources of imports are somewhat similar to the export patterns. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.3. (e). It can be seen that SA has a strong relationship with the EU, 33.7 percent of import 
origins from the EU. Other essential partners are China, United States, Japan and Saudi Arabia with 
about 10.7, 7.7, 6.6 and 4.5 percent respectively. Table 5.12. illustrates the import patterns of SA by 
main industries. Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. and Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. 
are the two most important product groups of import accounting for approximately  18.3 and 16.2 percent 
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respectively. Here, we can see a connection between the export and import sector where Mineral fuels 
etc. also represent an essential part. Other key  import industries are Electrical, electronic equipment, 
Vehicles other than railway, tramway and commodities not elsewhere specified with about 10.0, 9.9 and 
7.7 percent share of total import respectively.
Table 5.12. South Africa Top 5 import industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Imports value (USD 
thousands)
Imports as a share of total imports 
(%)
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. (27) 12,678,214 18.3251
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84) 11,181,907 16.1624
Electrical, electronic equipment (85) 6,893,036 9.9632
Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) 6,816,040 9.8519
Commodities not elsewhere specified (99) 5,333,109 7.7085
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
5.1.7. Swaziland
Figure 5.2. (f) shows that Swaziland’s first and foremost important export partner is found within the 
SADC group given the dominance of South Africa who receives a 45.2 percent share of total export 
followed by the 31.6 percent destined for Botswana. The third most important export partner is the EU 
receiving 14.4 percent of Swaziland’s exports and other main export partners are the United States and 
Japan where 3.2 and 2.6 percent of the exports are destined. The dominating export commodity  is 
Sugars and sugar confectionary  accounting for 16.8 percent of Swaziland’s exports. As can be seen in 
Table 5.13. there are only  minor differences in the percentage share of the total exports. Articles of 
apparel, accessories, knit or crochet as well as Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 
accounts for 9.6 and 8.8 percent respectively. Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries and Boilers, 
machinery; nuclear reactors, etc. represents approximately  9.5 percent each of total export. Those 
product groups are represented in Swaziland’s top 5 import commodities as well. However, as we have 
chosen to present the statistics from the main HS groups, detailed product-information is lost and the 
exports commodities are supposedly manufactured goods produced based on the imported products. 
This is backed by figure 1 in Appendix  I where manufactures represent approximately 70 percent of the 
country’s total exports.
Table 5.13. Swaziland Top 5 export industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Exports value (USD thousands) Exports as a share of total 
exports (%)
Sugars and sugar confectionary (17) 130,256 16.7521
Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet (61) 74,456 9.5757
Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries (33) 74,129 9.5337
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors, etc. (84) 73,597 9.4653
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet (62) 68,343 8.7895
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
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The SADC countries, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. (f), dominate Swaziland’s import source. A great 
majority  of the commodities, 92.9 percent, are imported from South Africa. Other sources of import are 
Namibia, Lesotho, Hong Kong (China) and Botswana, representing 2.2, 1.4, 0.9 and 0.5 percent 
respectively. Swaziland’s top 5 import industries are listed in Table 5.14 where the most important HS 
product group is Knitted or crocheted fabric, representing 14.6 percent share of total import. Moreover 
there are Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactor etc., 11.8 percent, Electrical, electronic equipment, 10.9 
percent and Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries, 10.1 percent. Further there is Vehicles other 
than railway, tramway representing a 5.0 percent share of total imports.
Table 5.14. Swaziland Top 5 import industries (HS) 2006
HS Group name (no.) Imports value (USD thousands) Imports as a share of total imports 
(%)
Knitted or crocheted fabric (60) 23,549 14.5711
Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84) 19,035 11.7781
Electrical, electronic equipment (85) 17,658 10.9260
Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toiletries 16,371 10.1297
Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) 8,117 5.0225
Source: ITC (2008) Trade Competitiveness Map.
5.2. Effects on the EU-SADC Trade
As presented in the previous section, the SADC EPA countries are very dependent on their exports and 
import patterns with the European Union. However, this relationship is asymmetrical whereas the EU’s 
trade patterns do not illustrate great shares of exports and imports from and to the SADC EPA states 
(WTO, 2009, Trade Profile EU (27)). This relationship is important to acknowledge when analyzing the 
trade effects of the EU-SADC EPA. 
 
From the trade data presented in the previous section it can be seen that the SADC EPA states’ 
dependence on EU for export varies. In the breakdown of main destinations of exports for the SADC 
EPA states it is established that the EU constitutes an important share of the export for Botswana and 
Namibia with 67.7 and 44.7 percent respectively. However, the EU is not first place export partner for all 
SADC EPA states. For countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique the EU comprises only  a minor 
share of the countries’ total exports. Illustrated in Figure 5.2. this is somewhat true for Angola as well 
who exports 4.8. percent of total exports to France, although we have reason to believe that this share 
is higher for the EU’s total share of Angola’s exports. This indicates that the effect of the EPA will vary  in-
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between the states given that there is a prior interchange of goods. We do not expect the overall trade 
from SADC to the EU to increase extensively after the introduction of the Interim EPA, as there have 
been preferential trade agreements for ACP countries’ exports to the EU for a long period of time. 
However, minor differences are to be expected as an effect of the Interim EPA especially in countries 
with a dominating exports destined for the EU. As the Interim EPA introduces a complete liberalization of 
trade including commodities previously protected because of their sensitive nature, an increase in 
export is to be expected. Nevertheless, in the case of countries with prior small shares of exports 
destined for the EU we do not expect a large increase in export volumes, as there is no extensive 
demand on commodities from those countries. There is however a large demand for keeping the 
previous preferential access to the EU market among the SADC EPA countries so one indirect effect of 
the agreement would therefore be that the exports levels stay  roughly the same. One of the major 
concerns of the negotiating parties is for the trade between the parties not to decline (European 
Commission, EPA Update, 2009).  
When reviewing the reverse relationship between the EU and the SADC EPA states, we find that there 
are important trade patterns indicating plausible effects on EU exports to the SADC EPA region 
following the 80-85 percent liberalization on SADC EPA States’ tariffs on EU imports. The SADC EPA 
countries import significant shares of their total imports from the EU, whereas the figures varies in-
between the states. For the countries Mozambique, Namibia and Botswana, where imports from the EU 
are valuable, we expect EU producers to increase their exports since they already  hold important 
market shares. The initial levels of tariffs affect the scale of the increase whereas we believe that the 
largest increase will be seen in Mozambique due to their, on-average, higher levels of tariffs on non-
agricultural goods (see table 5.4.). The commodities dominating import for those countries are Mineral, 
fuels, oils, distillation products etc. (27), Vehicles other than railway, tramway  (87) and in the case of 
Mozambique, Commodities not elsewhere specified (99) as described in section 5.1. Most likely  it is 
those industry groups that are principally affected when trade increases. An increase of imports from the 
EU is most likely  to be the case in Angola as well considering the country’s high level of imports from 
Portugal. Another reason to consider an increase in Angola’s imports from the EU is based on the fact 
that the Portuguese share of total imports does not represent the total EU area and as described in the 
previous section, Angola’s imports mainly  consists of Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors etc. (84,) 
specified as manufactures, which is the EU’s main export commodity group (WTO, 2009, Trade Profiles 
EU  (27)). However, one should bear in mind that Angola is an LDC-country with a specific trade pattern 
and has therefore enjoyed other privileges than the rest of the SADC EPA countries, which may affect 
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the Interim EPA differently than the other countries. On average, Angola’s tariffs on non-agricultural 
products are lower that the rest of the SADC EPA members. Thus, this indicates a smaller change in 
imports from the EU is to be expected. However, the differences in tariffs are very  small, and could 
therefore be considered unimportant. Furthermore, the effect is expected to be less extensive in 
Swaziland and Lesotho as their import from the EU is a minor share of total import as described in 
section 5.5. We do however expect a rise in import volumes sourced from the EU, possibly as a result of 
reduced dependence on SA imports when trade between the EU and SADC EPA is liberalized. 
 
5.3. Effects on the Intra-SADC Trade
From the trade analysis previously  in this chapter we recognize that the trade relationship in-between 
the SADC EPA States is less developed compared with the countries’ trade flows with the EU and the 
rest of the world. Considering the low levels of intra-trade within the SADC region, we expect the Interim 
EPA between the EU and SADC to affect this relationship. As concluded in the previous section, we 
expect the trade from the EU to increase due to tariff liberalization in the SADC EPA countries. This will 
cause the intra-SADC trade patterns to change. 
South Africa is the dominant trade power in the region and an essential part of the trade taking place 
within the SADC area involves South Africa. This indicates that the Interim EPA most likely will lead to 
increased EU exports on the expense of the South African exporters. As described in section 5.1. all 
SADC EPA States, with the exception of Angola, import a majority  of their commodities from South 
Africa. For the countries Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) it is feasible that EU 
imports will out-weight South African imports due to the Interim EPA. Would this be the case, BLNS 
would benefit form the lower prices on imports and therefore experience the benefits of trade creation. 
In general the countries’ imports large levels of goods from the industries Boilers, machinery; nuclear 
reactors etc. (84), Vehicles other than railway, tramway (87) and Electrical, electronic equipment (85), 
which indicate that the SA exports to these countries can be considered threatened by the EU  seeing 
that the EU exports more advanced manufactures rather than primary goods and agricultural products 
(WTO, 2009, Trade Profiles EU(27)). This is also in line with the wishes of BLNS since they have a 
desire to reduce their dependence on trade with SA (Draper & Khumalo, 2009:4). Despite the fact that 
BLNS are rather similar when it comes to trade effects of the Interim EPA, we do expect to observe 
certain, although relatively small, differences followed a closer breakdown of the countries’ trade 
patterns. Botswana imports most of their products within the Mineral, fuels, oils, distillation products etc. 
(27) industry group and Lesotho is more dependent on their textile industry. Namibia imports mostly 
31
Vehicles other than railway, tramway  (87) and Swaziland imports Knitted or crocheted fabric (60). 
Despite this potential evidence on reduced importance of SA, the figures on SA dominance in the region 
indicate that the relationship within the CU is very  deep and will thus not be affected in a significantly 
notable way. The situation is similar for Mozambique, considering the country’s deep links with SA. Their 
imports are expected to be affected by the trade liberalization and the increase of EU imports will be on 
the expense of SA. Data presented i section 5.1.4. on the country’s import patterns indicate that there 
will be trade creation of this kind. The situation for Angola is different to some extent. Increased EU 
imports in the SADC area does not necessarily have to affect the Angolan trade situation considering 
that SA does not play  a major part in the country’s trade patterns. As presented in section 5.1.1. the 
Angolan economy does not rely significantly on other SADC members for trade, which illustrates that 
the country’s intra-SADC trade will not be significantly  affected by the EU-SADC Interim EPA. However, 
we can derive intra-SADC trade effects on other SADC EPA States.  
The Interim EPA will also affect other export nations, not solely  SA, within the SADC EPA region. In 
section 5.1. we presented the countries’ trade patterns and these illustrate that for nearly all SADC EPA 
states, intra-SADC exports are essential for the trade industries. As for imports, the majority of the intra-
SADC exports are destined for SA. Along with the exports destined for other SADC EPA States and 
SADC countries (e.g. Zimbabwe and Zambia), the competition from the EU will likely  cause a reduction 
in exports from these countries. However, it is difficult to estimate whether this decrease will affect the 
SADC EPA exporting countries negatively  seeing that the increased imports from the EU might be 
significantly  higher in sectors where the SADC EPA countries are less dominate. The increased 
competition from the EU will therefore have a larger effects on the trade with ROW instead of intra-
SADC (excluding SA). The effects on ROW are discussed in the next section, 5.4. Moreover, this intra-
SADC change, excluding SA, will most likely  have the largest impact on the Swaziland import industry. 
Namibia, Lesotho and Botswana together represent 4.1 percent of Swaziland’s imports. Consequently, 
the lower EU import prices may result in a larger share of Swaziland’s imports sourced from Europe, in 
addition to plausible lower levels of exports for Namibia, Lesotho and Botswana.
5.4. Effects on the Rest of the World
As an effect of the proposed changes in trade patterns due to the EU-SADC Interim EPA there will be 
consequences on the trade patterns with the rest of the world. To what extent the SADC EPA trade will 
change can somewhat be dependent on previous sector specific trade preferences with important 
ROW-trade partners (e.g. The US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity  Act (AGOA) which has enabled 
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textile exports from African countries (http://www.agoa.gov). This analysis does not cover special trade 
preferences outside of the SADC region and our discussion is based on the trade data presented in the 
previous sections. 
In section 5.2. we estimated a small change in SADC exports to the EU which to some extent can be 
taking place on the expense on trade partners from ROW. However, seeing that exports from SADC 
already enjoy preferential treatment on the EU market, this potential increase will act to further deepen 
the trade diversion taking place within the EU. Furthermore, our estimation of an increase in European 
influence within the SADC EPA region can cause trade to be diverted from the previous suppliers in 
third countries/ROW to EU imports turned cheaper due to tariff liberalization. The overall effects of trade 
diversion will be relatively  small since the existing import tariffs on average are low in the SADC region 
(World Bank, 2008:18). Returning to section 5.1., where the SADC  EPA countries’ import patterns are 
analyzed, we see that a common import partner for a majority  of the SADC EPA countries is China. The 
only exception is Swaziland where China does not reach the list of top 5 import sources. Therefore, we 
argue that the are possibilities of trade diversion affecting China negatively  since their production is 
replaced by  supplies from the now less expensive European producers. The United States is an 
essential source of imports in Angola, Namibia and Botswana. In these countries, the trade patterns 
indicate feasibly  effects of trade diversion directed against the US since imports from the EU may out-
weight previously  cheaper and more efficient producers. In addition, exporters such as Hong Kong 
(China), India, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, Japan and Saudi Arabia etc. may  see a decrease in 
their exports to the SADC EPA States due to the liberalization on EU imports. However, it is likely that 
these effects are smaller in large, rich countries because of their assumed ability  to diverse their exports 
and thus not suffer large damages following changes in small countries’ (e.g. the SADC EPA States) 
import patterns. Small exporting countries specializing in certain products will be worse off if trade is 
diverted to cheaper EU suppliers. In the SADC EPA countries, a certain amount of goods are imported 
from unspecified trade partners (“others” in the figures 5.1., 5.2. and 5.3.) which are likely  to include 
some vulnerable exporting countries. Furthermore, we assume the trade diversion to foremost affect the 
manufactures industries since this is where the concerned third countries/ROW focus the majority  of 
their export sectors. Furthermore, the analysis regarding trade diversion following the EU-SADC EPA 
depends on the existing tariff levels in the liberalizing countries (World Bank, 2008:18). The SACU 
members and Angola have, on average, initially  low  level of tariffs, which can indicate less trade 
diversion in ROW.  However, Mozambique is the country  with the highest tariffs (on average) and could 
therefore cause more diversion of trade due to tariff liberalization on EU imports. Trade diversion as an 
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effect of the EU-SADC Interim EPA will be less significant if the negotiating parties at the same time 
opened up to multilateral trade liberalization since the differences in tariffs would be reduced. 
5.4.1. Effects of rules of origin
Following the Interim EPA, the rules of origin is to be liberalized. This indicate that the trade pattern from 
the SADC countries towards the EU might be slightly altered as there are new  possibilities for SADC 
EPA producers to process imported goods and thereafter export it to the EU. Previous set of rules 
implied that the ACP states could only process goods imported from the EU, but not from a third 
country/ROW, as the goods then fell outside the trade preference scheme for goods destined for the EU 
(World Bank, 2008:9f). The effect of the relaxed ROO is supposedly  an improved market access for the 
SADC EPA producers as they now have access to competitive priced goods from ROW and other 
SADC countries. Intra-SADC trade will most likely  gain from the new regulations. The same goes for the 
overall welfare effect that will be positively affected as the risk of trade diversion, as described in the 
previous section, is reduced when the most competitive priced intermediate may be used for 
processing. Furthermore, it is likely that the SADC EPA producers’ integration to larger production 
networks promotes a more diversified export structure, which is very important for the future 
development of the region.
5.5. Fiscal effects
Exports from the EU destined for the SADC  market is to be 80-85 percent free from duties and tariffs 
following the interim EPA signed by the negotiating parties. SADC imports a significant share of their 
commodities from the EU, which leads to certain fiscal effects in the SADC EPA countries. 
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As can be seen in figure 5.4. the SACU countries, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland, being a customs union, applies the same MFN tariffs on all goods. This reflects their 
harmonized trade relationship and as the largest trade nation in the union, South Africa plays an 
important role in SACU. Due to their participation in the SACU, the member countries are supposedly 
better prepared for the 80-85 percent duty- and quota-free imports from the EU. Almost all trade with 
SADC is liberalized in the SACU, which indicates that the countries are well prepared for further trade 
liberalization with the EU (SACU Trade Data, 2007). Nevertheless, within the SACU, different member 
states may react differently to a reduction in tariff revenues. Based on figure 5.2. (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) 
the countries most vulnerable to tariff liberalization on 80-85 percent of all goods imported from the EU 
are South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. However, as previously  mentioned, South Africa has a 
separate trade agreement with the EU defining an FTA between the parties, whereas the country  is 
likely  to have initiated policies for such a liberalization. Namibia and Botswana on the other hand might 
be in a more difficult situation whereas they  export important shares of their goods to the EU. In 
addition, these countries are highly dependent on trade with SA which is already liberalized.
Mozambique is the country  with the highest MFN tariffs in the SADC EPA region, which can indicate a 
high level of vulnerability when it comes to the 80-85 percent tariff liberalization on EU  imports. In 
addition, Mozambique imports approximately  23.5 percent of their total imports from the EU which 
demonstrates that the country  may experience difficulties when tariffs are reduced on EU imports. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by  the fact that the country imports their largest share of goods in 
non-sensitive industries as described in the Interim EPA, such as Commodities not elsewhere specified, 
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products etc. and Vehicles other than railway and tramway since these 
imports are not likely  to be excluded from the liberalization process. Despite this, Mozambique is the 
country with the highest tariffs on agricultural products which reflect that the country will continue to 
protect its agricultural sector even post-trade liberalization and still gain, although little, government 
revenue. 
We can see that Angola has the lowest applied MFN tariffs on all goods, however higher than the SACU 
members on agricultural goods. Despite their low tariff rates, Angola can be assumed to be vulnerable 
to tariff revenue losses considering their status as a LDC. On the other hand, Angola has higher tariffs 
on agricultural products which are included in the group of sensitive products which are to be excluded 
from tariff liberalization in the EPA-liberalization process. Thus, the country might be in a better position 
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when it comes to fiscal effects of the Interim EPA. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the lack 
of data regarding the EU’s position among the main import and export partners, which makes is difficult 
to predict the overall fiscal effects on government’s income losses from EU imports.  
5.6. Development effects of the EU-SADC EPA
When the SADC EPA states signs the Interim EPA it will cause indirect effects on the economies that 
are not evident in statistics but rather a deepening of analysis made from theory  of development effects 
presented in Section 3.3. One of those effects is the increased competition on imports from non-SADC 
EPA countries, other than the EU. Mainly it is the imported commodities from SA, which is a dominant 
import partner as described in previous sections. The EU produces goods that can be equivalent to the 
goods produced by  SA. This can lead to better quality goods and lower prices for consumers in the 
SADC region, a region at present recognized for the low levels of trade diversification and competition. 
Furthermore new sources of imports may  bring technological progress to the region, which is a vital 
factor for future development.
Another aspect that should not be neglected is the similarities in export structure between the SADC 
EPA states. Mainly  it is primary  goods such as mineral fuels, different types of metals, precious stones 
and fish that dominate exports. In theory, competitive economies are preferable but as there are no, or 
limited possibility  to specialization in the case of primary  goods, the positive effects may fail to come off. 
This could also indicate that the export commodities of one SADC EPA country, easily  can be replaced 
by the commodities of a neighbor country. In that case, the sensitivity  to natural disasters and exchange 
rate movements might be even greater. With the export structure of today’s SADC EPA region there is 
limited prospects to take advantage of other development effects such as economies of scale in the 
near future. However, the increase in EU competition on SADC EPA production might have a short run 
negative impact, but in the long run it is positive for the region’s development as competition promote 
advance in quality and production structure.
Another area that raises interest on development of the EU-SADC Interim EPA is the fiscal impacts of 
the agreement. As we expect the fiscal difficulties of the SADC EPA countries to be tangible as a result 
of the tariff liberalization, the governments’ handling of the states financial resources need to change. 
Moreover, the implementation of the Interim EPA will give the countries involved legitimate reasons for 
reforming their state finances due to large losses in tariff revenues (World Bank, 2008:22). Domestic tax 
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systems need to become stronger and more efficient and the government’s need to become more 
sufficient in collecting tariff revenues. Thus, Interim EPA can in the long run lead to better state finances 
and more efficient government administration. 
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6. Conclusions
This paper analyses the design, structure and likely  outcome of an EPA between the EU and the SADC 
EPA member states. Our intention has been to analyze the effects and impacts on SADC EPA 
economies of the agreement. 
As trade is liberalized an overall increase in trade with the EU is expected. Consumer welfare is 
expected to rise as an effect of the introduction of less expensive commodities imported from the EU. 
Export from the SADC EPA states destined to the EU will presumably rise. However, this effect might be 
overestimated due to previous trade preferences granting ACP exporters duty- and quota-free access to 
the EU market. Moreover, the exporters’ dependence on demand and elasticity  in production, as well as 
the goods sensitivity  to fluctuations in world market price will affect the overall effects of the EU-SADC 
EPA. The latter is especially  true for the SADC countries as they, to a great extent, export primary  and 
non-diversified goods. Furthermore, trade patterns within the SADC region are expected to change as 
an effect of the tariff liberalization which will cause the intra-SADC trade patterns to change. It is likely 
that the dependence on South Africa as a trading partner will decrease when the Interim EPA enter in 
force. The change is analyzed with respect to tariff reduction and relaxed rules of origin. The SADC 
EPA region’s trade with rest of the world is also predicted to be altered. We estimate the increase in 
European influence within the SADC EPA region to cause trade to be diverted from the previous 
suppliers in ROW to EU imports turned cheaper due to tariff liberalization. Furthermore, we do not 
predict this trade diversion effect to be significantly  large as tariffs on imports on average are low  in the 
SADC region.
When evaluating the effect of the Interim EPA, the loss of government revenue when tariffs are 
liberalized is another area of concern. The magnitude of the income losses is hard to predict but we 
assume that they  will be an issue of concern for the SADC EPA countries. The same goes for the 
development effects. In the short run we do not expect to see positive effects of the expected increased 
of competition promoting more effective production and lower consumer prices. In the long run the 
SADC EPA states may enjoy increased trade diversification, economies of scale and get access to 
technological progress. 
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Finally, the alternatives of the EU-SADC Interim EPA are discussed. We can see that for a majority  of 
the SADC EPA States, the trade preferences given outside of the EPA-framework are less beneficial 
than both the Lomé/Cotonou and the EPA. The only  SADC member currently  trading with the EU under 
the EBA-preferences is Angola, seeing that their export industry largely depend on petroleum.  
6.1. Policy implications
The Lomé/Cotonou trade preference scheme is no longer an option for the ACP countries wanting 
preferential treatment on the EU market. Thus it is important to briefly  emphasize the alternatives to the 
EU-SADC Interim and future full EPA. For the LDCs of the agreements, Angola, Lesotho and 
Mozambique, have the possibility is to join the Everything but Arms (EBA) scheme presented to all 
LDCs by the EU. This trade preference scheme is not as beneficial as the EPAs when it comes to 
access to the EU market, but it does not call for the LDCs to liberalize trade on a reciprocal basis such 
as the Interim EPA (Curran et al., 2008:531). Among the SADC EPA States, Angola now  trades with the 
EU  under the EBA, but this is not the case for Lesotho and Mozambique who have signed the Interim 
EPA (European Commission, EPA Update, 2009). However, as concluded in section 5.1., Angola’s trade 
patterns differs somewhat compared with the rest of the SADC EPA countries. Their main export 
commodity  is petroleum (98 percent of total exports) and the EBA is thus an option reasonable enough 
to consider before signing the Interim EPA. 
Not all SADC EPA States can enter the EBA trade scheme and for the rest of the members (excluding 
SA) the alternatives are the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the GSP+. With the GSP 
the SADC EPA States would be in the same import category as other developing countries, e.g. China, 
India etc. Thus, the competition for the SADC EPA countries’ exports would increase significantly and an 
immediate effect of this could be large reduction of exports from the SADC EPA States destined for the 
EU  (Curran et al., 2008:540). Furthermore, the GSP+ preference scheme offered by the EU is more 
beneficial than the general GSP, but contains certain conditions for participating countries. These 
conditions are linked to the objective of the scheme, namely “sustainable development”  (Curran et al., 
2008:541). Thus, the SADC EPA States are not likely going to join the GSP or the GSP+ scheme seeing 
that the effects and conditions are non-beneficial. As previously mentioned, these options do not apply 
for SA who has it’s own trade agreement with the EU. 
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